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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VALIDITY OF
CARRIER REGULATION REQUIRING RACIAL SEGREGATION
Plaintiff, a Negro school teacher traveling south from Philadelphia on
defendant's train, was allowed to ride in a coach normally reserved for white
passengers, until the train reached Richmond. At Richmond the trainmen, in
attempting to enforce defendant's regulations calling for racial segregation
ordered plaintiff to move to another car. He refused and was later ejected. In
a suit for wrongful ejection plaintiff appeals the judgment of the lower
court, which found the regulation to be valid. Held, reversed; the regulation
imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce and is therefore unconstitutional. Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951).

In Plessy v. Ferguson' the Supreme Court held that a law which requires the separation of white and colored races in public conveyances of
interstate character is a reasonable exercise of state police power and does
not deprive a colored person of any rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
2
provided there is substantial equality of treatment and accommodations.
The Supreme Court took an entirely different approach to the problem in
Morgan v. Virginia,3 however, and found a state statute compelling racial
segregation and requiring shifting of interstate passengers in vehicles crossing
state lines to be an unconstitutional interference with the national power over
interstate commerce. 4 The Court reached this result by relying on Hall v.
1. 163 U.S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
2. Recent cases have strictly construed this "separate but equal" doctrine, and it
has been held that the requirements are not met when certain tables in a dining car are
partitioned off for Negroes [Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 Sup. Ct. 843,
94 L. Ed. 1302 (1950) (decision actually based on Interstate Commerce Act) ], or when
a Negro is denied access to a Pullman car. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 Sup.
Ct. 873, 85 L. Ed. 1201 (1941). Either "separate but equal" cars must be provided or
else the races must be allowed to mix without discrimination. It has been held that
before a plaintiff can maintain a federal court damage suit for violation of the Interstate Commerce Act he must first pursue his remedy before the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Greene v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 19 U.S.L. WEEE: 2344 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 1951). This problem, however, did not arise in the instant case since
the carrier regulation was contested on the basis of its constitutionality and not as a
violation of the Act.
3. 328 U.S. 373, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946). For law review comments
on this case see, e.g., Richardson, Segregation of Passengers on Common Carriers on
Basis of Race, 37 Ky. L.J. 140, 142 (1949) ; 46 COL. L. REv. 853 (1946) ; 19 TENN. L.
REv. 794 (1947) ; 32 VA. L. REv. 1064 (1946).
4. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. "Where uniformity is essential for the functioning of
commerce, a state may not interpose its local regulation." Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373, 377, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946). In New v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,
186 Va. 726, 43 S.E2d 872 (1947), the statute providing for separation of white and
colored passengers in motor-buses was held to be severable as to its subject matter, ind
thus valid as to intrastate passengers notwithstanding its invalidity as applied to interstate passengers as being an undue burden on interstate commerce. See also REi-,,
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

127-34 (1951).
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DeCuir,5 where a state statute which forbade segregation on public carriers
was held unconstitutional as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce.
The instant case differs from the Morgan case in that it involves a
regulation voluntarily adopted and enforced by the carrier.6 The court holds
that the regulation, like a statute, constitutes a burden on interstate commerce
when its enforcement interferes with the uniformity which should characterize
interstate carriage from one end of the route to the other. Thus, either a local
statute which imposes additional duties on a carrier7 or a statute or carrier
rule which creates an unreasonable inconvenience to passengers8 will be
treated as placing an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In the principal case the passenger had entered the carrier in a nonsegregation state, and the subsequent enforcement of the segregation rule
required movement from one car to another while in transit. Should the same
position be taken when the passenger entered the carrier in a segregation
state and was not required to move en route? The position of the court on
this point is equivocal. On the one hand it sought to distinguish its previous
decision in Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,9 in which it had held, in line
with other recent decisions,' 0 that a carrier may establish rules which require
white and colored passengers to occupy separate accommodations, 1 and that
enforcement of such rules does not burden interstate commerce when a
passenger may take a seat and retain it to the end of his journey. 12 On the
other hand there is language in the opinion which indicates that segregation
of some passengers together with the nonsegregation of other interstate
passengers would create such confusion and inconvenience as to amount to
3
an unconstitutional burden on commerce.1
5. 95 U.S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878).

6. The regulation was enforced at the convenience of the carrier and not as to
passengers on Pullman and dining cars. Nor was the regulation enforced in Virginia
between Washington, D. C., and Richmond. Some emphasis was placed on the resulting
confusion, but this was not the turning point of the case.
7. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946).
8. In addition to the instant case, see Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 V.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1949).
9. 171 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948).
10. Simmons v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 75 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Va. 1947)
Pridgen v. Carolina Coach Co., 229 N.C. 46, 47 S.E.2d 609 (1948); cf. Nash v. Air
Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
11. There must be no discrimination in the arrangement. Chiles v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry., 218 U.S. 71, 30 Sup. Ct. 667, 54 L. Ed. 936 (1910) ; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S.
485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878).
12. In Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 68 Sup. Ct. 358, 92 L. Ed.
455 (1948), the Supreme Court held that enforcement of the Michigan Civil Rights
Act which prohibited discrimination did not impose a burden on foreign commerce,
which was of such peculiarly local concern that it could be regulated by a state. See
Abel, The Commerce Power: An Instrument of Federalism, 25 IxD. L.J. 498 (1950)
Notes, 58 YALE L.J. 329 (1949), 48 COL. L. RaV. 733 (1948).
13. "Not only does .. . enforcement [of the regulation] interfere with the uniformity
which should characterize interstate carriage from one end of the route to the other, but
its irregular enforcement for the convenience of the carrier, dependent upon the number
of passengers and the character of accommodations which they purchase, adds to the
burden upon the traffic by increasing the confusion and discomfort of the passengers.
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The question also remains as to whether segregation of intrastate passengers on an interstate carrier will be declared unconstitutional. One view
might be that the resultant confusion in attempting to enforce segregation
in one case and not in another would impose a burden on interstate commerce, 14 while another view might be that no burden is created because no
rearrangement of passengers in transit is required. 15
It is conceivable that segregation in strictly intrastate commerce will be
held unconstitutional where such commerce "affects" interstate commerce,
placing a burden on it. This seems unlikely, however. There is perhaps somewhat more likelihood that the Supreme Court will utilize the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to declare unconstitutional the segregation of the races in all public transportation.' 6

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLITICAL QUESTIONS-GEORGIA COUNTY
UNIT VOTE SYSTEM
Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court against the
Chairman of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and others
to restrain adherefce to the Georgia county unit systen' in the primary
elections for United States Senator, Governor and other state offices. By
this system each county is allotted unit votes, varying from two to six, depending upon the population. The candidate who receives the largest popular vote
in each county is said to have carried that county and is given the appropriate
unit votes. Plaintiffs, residents of the most populous county, contended that
the law violates the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, since their
votes average but one-tenth of the weight of the votes in other counties. The
District Court dismissed the suit, and the plaintiffs appealed. Held (7-2),
affirmed. Federal courts will not exercise their equity powers in cases posing
political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral
When white and colored passengers are permitted to ride together for part of their
journey through the State of Virginia, and then are compelled to separate and change
cars, and when passengers in coaches are segregated on account of race while passengers
in Pullman and dining cars are permitted to ride together irrespective of race, the
burden upon interstate commerce is . . .clearly manifest . . ." 183 F.2d at 882-83.
14. "It seems clear to us that seating arrangements for the different races in interstate motor travel require a single, uniform rule to promote and protect national travel."
Morgan v,Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946). Does
this suggest that the same rule must be applied to both interstate and intrastate passengers
on an interstate carrier or merely that all interstate passengers must be treated the same
way?
15. See State v. Johnson, 229 N.C. 701, 51 S.E.2d 186 (1949); New v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp., 186 Va. 726, 43 S.E.2d 872 (1947).
16. And thereby overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1188, 41 L.
Ed. 256 (1896) See Note, 49 COL. L. REa. 629 (1949). Compare, Hyman, Segregation and
the Fourteenth Amendment, supra p. 555.
1. GA. CODE ANx. § 34-3212 (1933).
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strength. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 70 Sup. Ct. 641, 94 L. Ed. 834
(1950).
A "political" question is generally recognized as one which the judiciary
will not decide, since the ultimate decision must rest with the other departments of the government or with the people.2 Although there is no specific
limitation in the Constitution, this accepted principle is presumed to be based
on the theories of the separation and distribution of powers. 3 Other reasons
suggested are that the courts would be incompetent to handle such matters
because of a lack of legal principles, 4 that the court in a given case may feel
that the question is too delicate and pass the burden to another department,6
or that judicial control might result in an even less desirable situation.6
Classification of these cases according to subject matter1 or character of the
parties and interests8 has been attempted, but all admit that no true test has
yet evolved for this self-imposed judicial limitation.
Some "questions are obviously political in their nature; in these cases,
the federal courts, 9 as welt as the state courts, 10 appear to be in complete
accord. As to other matters the nature of the question is not as readily apparent, and the instant case falls within this group. The Supreme Court has in
2. See ROTTSCnAEFER, Al-altcAr CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 68 (1939); 3 WiLLouoImnv,
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1326 (2d ed. 1929); 16 C.J.S., ConstitutionalLaw

§ 145 (1939) ; Weston, PoliticalQuestions, 38 HARv. L. Rv. 296 (1925).

3. "This distinction results from the organization of the government into the three
great departments, executive, legislative and judicial. . . " Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall.
50, 71, 18 L. Ed. 721 (1867). See also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 Sup.
Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078 (1923) ; Renck v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320, 187 P.2d 656
(1947) ; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L.
R v. 485 (1924); Rutledge, When Is a Political Question Justiciable? 9 GA. B.J. 394
(1947). A further distinction should be noticed between this doctrine and the power of
the courts over purely ministerial duties of officials. Massachusets v. Mellon, supra.
4. Field, The Doctrine of Politicial Questions it the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L.
R-v. 485 (1924).
5. See Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. Rxv. 338 (1924), where
it is suggested that his is a wholesome influence on the part of the judiciary.
6. "And the cure sought may be worse than the disease." Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 566, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946) (concurring opinion of Justice
Rutledge).
7. FiELD, supra note 4.
8. ROTTScHAEFER, op. cit. supra note 2 at 70.
9. E.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 Sup. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939)
(ratification of amendment); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 22 Sup. Ct. 484, 46
L. Ed. 534 (1902) (determining existence of treaty) ; In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 10 Sup.
Ct. 854, 34 L. Ed. 222 (1890) (recognizing foreign ministers); Prize Cases, 2 Black
635, 17 L. Ed. 459 (1862) (determining existence of state of war) ; Luther v. Borden,
7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1848) (deciding if state has a republican form of government).
10. E.g., Dubuisson v. Simmons, 157 Fla. 473, 26 So.2d 438 (1946) (power to determine existence of state of war) ; Bullard v. Culpepper, 190 Ga. 848, 11 S.E.2d 19 (1940)
(interference by judiciary in primary elections); Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59
N.E.2d 18 (1945) (deciding necessity or propriety of exercising right of eminent
domaii); Stieritz v. Kaufman, 234 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1950) (calling of referendum
election); State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1935) (guarantee
of republican form of government) ; Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij,
289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942) (recognition of foreign governments); Application
of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937) (creation of city and establishment of
boundaries).
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the past vigorously protected the rights of voters when they have been discriminated against because of race, creed or color in primary or general
elections.11 That the principal case involves a primary election, then, would
seem to be unimportant in determining the result. The court has also protected
voters from enforcement of reapportionment laws invalid because not approved by the governor, as required by state law.12 On the other hand, it
has denied protection from statutes creating congressional districts unequal
in population,' 3 and from statutes allegedly discriminating against the forming
of new political parties. 14 The argument of Justices Douglas and Black, who
dissented in the instant case, was that the right to vote involves the right
to have the ballot counted at its full value without dilution. Furthermore, they
felt that as a practical matter this case would not be open to the objection
that action by the Court would amount to judicial supervision of elections. 15
The dissenting opinion further states that the system also produces a disenfranchisement of the Negro population which is heaviest in the urban areas.
Actually, the real discrimination appears to be in favor of the rural voters over
those in the urban areas.
In the case of gerrymandering or unequal apportionment, the voter 'still
has an effective vote within his' district; but under the 'unit vote system, the
weight of the individual's vote is affected within the entire area of representation, in this case the state. However, absolute equality in voting concededly
is impossible to achieve; and indeed, the Federal Constitution provides for
similar schemes by the electoral college and by providing for two senators
from every state regardless of area or population,' 6 although the discriminations here may not approach those found under the Georgia system.' 7
11. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 Sup. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984 (1932) ; Rice v. Elmore,
165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948), 1 VAND. L. REv. 645;

cf. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd inein., 336 U.S. 933 (1949),
2 VAND. L. REv. 696; Cushman, The Texas "White Primary" Case- Smith v. Allwright,
30 CORNELL L.Q. 66 (1944).
12. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 52 Sup. Ct. 397, 76 L. Ed. 795 (1932); Carrol
v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380, 52 Sup. Ct. 402, 76 L. Ed. 807 (1932). On the general subject
of reapportionment, see Chafee, Congressional Reapportionment, 42 HARv. L. Rxv. 1015
(1929) ; Note, Reapportionment of Congressional Districts in Illinois, 41 ILL. L. REv.
578 (1946).
13. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946);
Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 53 Sup. Ct. 1, 77 L. Ed. 131 (1932) ; 81 U. o, PA. L.

REv.343 (1933).

14. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 Sup. Ct. 1, 93 L. Ed. 3 (1948), 47
MicH. L. REv. 406 (1949).
15. 339 U.S. at 277 (dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas and Black). See also

United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 64 Sup. Ct. 1101, 88 L. Ed. 1341 (1944) ; United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941), 20 N.C.L.
REv 93. See also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed.
1432 (1946) (dissenting opinion of Justices Black, Murphy and Douglas).
16. See Note, Georgia County Unit Vote, 47 COL. L. REv. 284 (1947) for a collection of previous cases attacking this system and comparison of the Georgia system with

other methods that have been used. See also Curtis, A Modern Court in a Modern World,
supra p. 427, at 437-38.
17. In one instance under the Georgia unit vote a vote in one county is worth over
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During recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a policy of selfrestraint on problems of substantive due process, taking the viewpoint that
the Court cannot be concerned with the wisdom of the legislation and that
the people should be able, through their representatives, to decide to enact
such laws as they see fit. On the other hand, the Court has been alert to
overthrow restrictions on such liberties as freedom of speech because these
restrictions interfere with the process of determining what legislation the
people may decide to adopt. Many of the so-called "political questions" are
similar t6 the first class; they are concerned with matters which the people
can control through their elected representatives and which they can eventually
change if they desire. The problem in the instant case is more nearly like the
second class. The legislation involved here sets up a self-perpetuating condition that can effectively prevent the people of the State of Georgia from being
able to express and enforce their desires.18

DIVORCE-ALIMONY IN DEFAULT DECREES-POWER OF COURT TO
AWARD ALIMONY IN ABSENCE OF PRAYER THEREFOR IN
COMPLAINT
In a divorce action filed by his wife, relator was personally served with
summons and complaint to which he made no answer. The complaint did not
pray for an award of alimony and no notice was given to relator that additional relief would be sought or given by the court, but the trial judge made
an award of alimony under a statute conferring upon the court authority to
"make all necessary provisions as to alimony" in divorce cases. After contempt
proceedings were instituted against relator for failure to pay alimony, relator
sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court to prohibit further
action in the contempt proceedings. Held, writ of prohibition granted. The
award of alimony was not authorized; the statute could constitutionally apply
only where alimony was prayed for in the complaint. State ex rel. Adams v.
Superior Court, 220 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1950).
The general rule, produced by either statute or judicial decision, is that
"relief granted in a judgment by default must be, not only within the fair
scope of the allegations of the complaint, but also within the fair scope of the
prayer thereof. Under this rule, a judgment entered by default should not
contain an award of damages or grant relief in excess of that demanded in
120 times that of a vote in the most populous county. 339 U.S. at 278 (dissenting opinion
of Justices Douglas and Black).
18. See Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865, 128 Am. St. Rep. 242
(1907) (redistricting) ; Gates v. Long, 172 Tenn. 471, 113 S.W.2d 388 (1938) (county
unit vote), for the disposition of cases in other states involving similar problems.
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the pleadings of the plaintiff."' M1any courts have taken the position that
since a demand for alimony is not an essential part of the cause of action and
is merely incidental thereto, alimony may be awarded even in the absence
of a specific request therefor in the original bill or notice. 2 Statutes in many
states authorize such practice.3 The courts of several states have recognized
these statutes to be permissible exceptions to a general statute limiting relief
4
to that demanded in the complaint.
Washington, by judicial decision, follows the general rule limiting the
relief that may be granted in ordinary actions to that prayed for in the complaint.0 A Washington statute authorizes courts in divorce proceedings to
make all necessary orders as to alimony, custody of children, and property
settlements. 6 The court in the instant case construed the statute to apply only
to subject matter brought before the court by the complaint; to hold that
the statute authorizes the court to grant such relief in addition to that prayed
for in the complaint was held to be contrary to the due process clause of the
state constitution.7 In so holding, the court followed an earlier decision" on
the point which seemingly had been overruled in the meanwhile. 9
The question of due process of law was not raised in the other states
that have considered the question involved here.' 0 The court in the instant
case, however, failed to consider the peculiar position of the state as an in1. 31 Ar. JUR., Judgments § 516 (1940). The rule in Washington was laid down in
State ex rel. First National Bank v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 207 Pac. 23 (1922).
2. 2 BIsHoP, MARRIACE AND DIVORCE 417-18 (6th ed. 1881) : "In principle, the pro-.
ceeding for alimony being collateral to the main issue, whereof it is not necessarily a
part, and the hearing on this question being practically or permissively subsequent, and
a separate allegation of faculties with prayer for the alimony being in practice esteemed
requisite, no rule either of law or propriety requires that the same shall be also inserted
either in the libel or the answer." See Prescott v. Prescott, 59 Me. 146 (1871) ; Sprague
v. Sprague, 73 Minn. 474, 76 N.W. 268, 42 L.R.A. 419, 72 Am. St. Rep. 636 (1898)
Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N.Y. 272. 33 N.E. 1062 (1893).
3. See Note, 152 A.L.R. 445, 449 (1944). But in the absence of such a statute, it
has been held that a general statute limiting relief to that demanded in the complaint
curtails this practice. Bennett v. Bennett, 50 Cal. App. 48, 194 Pac. 503 (1920) ; cf.
Burtnett v. King, 33 Cal.2d 805, 205 P.2d 657 (1949).
4. Hopping v. Hopping, 233 Iowa 993, 10 N.W. 87, 152 A.L.R. 436 (1943) ; Ecker v.
Ecker, 130 Minn. 472, 153 N.W. 864 (1915).
5. See note 1 supra.
6. WASH. CODE § 23-15 (Pierce 1943) provides in part: "If, however, the court
determines that either party, or both, is entitled to a divorce an interlocutory order must
be entered accordingly, declaring that the party in whose favor the court decides is
entitled to a decree of divorce as hereinafter provided; which order shall also make
all necessary provisions as to alimony, costs, care, custody, support and education of
children and custody, management and division of property...
7. Art. I, § 3. The court did not consider the point that a "judgment is void unless
a reasonable method of notification is employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard
afforded to persons affected," [RESTATE11ENT, JUDGWENTS § 6 (1942)], and thus might
be attacked collaterally as a basis for the issuance of the writ of prohibition. See Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 Sup. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406 (1935); and
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).
8. Ermey v. Ermey, 18 Wash.2d 544, 139 P.2d 1016 (1943).
9. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 32 Wash.2d 53, 200 P.2d 527, 528 (1948).
10. See note 4 supra.
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terested party in divorce cases."' The constitutional requirements of due process, it seems, might well be less stringent in divorce cases than in ordinary
cases.12 The concept of procedural due process, intended to protect the rights
of private litigants, ought here to be defined in the light of this peculiar
interest of the state.' 3

EVIDENCE-PROOF OF CORPUS DELICTI-CORROBORATION OF
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION BY HIS OWN SPONTANEOUS
STATEMENTS
Defendant was convicted of the crime of illegally transporting liquor into
the state. The only evidence introduced by the state in the prosecution was
an extrajudicial confession obtained from the defendant by the police and
defendant's spontaneous statements. Defendant appeals on the ground that
the corpus delicti was not adequately proved. Held (5-3), there was adequate
proof of the corpus delicti. Defendant's spontaneous statements were sufficient
corroboration in the purview of the statute requiring an extrajudicial confession to be corroborated by other evidence. State v. Saltzman, 44 N.W.2d 24

(Iowa 1950).
11. "When an attempt is made through the courts to undo a marriage, the state
becomes in a sense a party to the proceedings ...." 17 A-.r. Jup., Divorce and Separation
§ 13 (1938). "The marriage status is a matter of public interest .... In view of this
interest of the public, an action for divorce is not a mere controversy between private
parties. . . ." MADDEN, DmESTiC RELATIONS 263 (1931). See Rehfuss v. Rehfuss, 169
Cal. 86, 145 Pac. 1020 (1915) ; Allen v. Allen, 73 Conn. 54, 46 Atl. 242, 49 L.R.A. 142,
84 Am. St. Rep. 135 (1900) ; People v. Case, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N.E. 638, 25 L.R.A. (N.s.)
578 (1909); Franklin v. Franklin, 40 Mont. 348, 106 Pac. 353, 26 L.R.A. (N.s.) 490,
20 Ann. Cas. 339 (1910); Grant v. Grant, 84 N.J.Eq. 81, 92 Atl. 791 (1914); State
ex rel. Fowler v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65, 207 Pac. 75, 22 A.L.R. 1101 (1922) ; Schultz v.
Schultz, 46 Wyo. 121, 23 P.2d 351 (1933).
12. Furthermore, the constitutional requirements with respect to a court order in
default judgment proceedings for a divorce might not be the same for an award of alimony
as for an order with respect to division of property. There is a divergence of opinion as
to the necessity of making specific allegations as to the property rights of the parties
in order to procure a disposition of property in divorce proceedings. See Note, 152 A.L.R.
445, 454 (1944).
13. The use of the writ of prohibition in this case raises an interesting procedural
point. Prohibition as a rule does not lie for grievances which may be redressed in the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings by other remedies provided by law, 22 R.C.L.,
Prohibition § 3 (1918). The Washington Supreme Court has emphasized that the test
for the use of prohibition is the adequacy of remedy by appeal or in the ordinary course
of law and not the mere question of jurisdiction or lack thereof. State cx rel. Miller
v. Superior Court, 40 Wash. 555, 82 Pac. 877, 111 Am. St. Rep. 925 (1905).
A judgment for contempt of court may be appealed in Washington "in a like manner
and with like effect as a judgment in an ordinary action," WAsH. CODE § 20-27 (Pierce
1943), and proceedings may be stayed pending the appeal. State cx rcl. Denham v.
Superior Court, 28 Wash. 590, 68 Pac. 1051 (1902). There is no suggestion in the instant
case that such appeal would not have been a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy." In
Washington the writ of prohibition is available in all cases "where there is not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." WASH. CODE § 17-3 (Pierce
1943). The availability of prohibition in this case may be explained, as the court suggests
early in its opinion, by the failure of the respondent to file an answer to the application
of the relator for the writ. 200 P.2d at 1083. The Washington rule is that, if the
respondent does not answer the application for the writ, "the case must be heard (in
the papers of the applicant" VAsa. CODE § 16-19 (Pierce 1943).
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It is an elementary principle of criminal law that a state, to be entitled
to a conviction, must prove the corpus delicti.1 This term is generally said
to mean, when applied to a particular offense, that the specific crime charged
has been committeed by someone. 2 The corpus delicti must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.3 In the proof either direct or circumstantial evidence may
be used.4
In the United States, while the corpus delicti cannot be established by a
confession alone, it may be established by a confession if it is corroborated
by other evidence.5 Although there is slight authority to the contrary,0 it
is almost universally held that this corroborative evidence need not be independently sufficient to prove the corpus delicti.7 There is no detailed rule
defining the nature of the evidence required; the sufficiency of the corroboration depends upon the circumstances of each case.8 It must be borne in mind
that confessions may be unfounded, and this rule is designed to prevent a
conviction in such a situation. 9 It has been said that the evidence must be
material and substantial,' 0 but the cases indicate that the slightest evidence
is sufficient."'
The Iowa statute in the instant case,' 2 which requires a confession to be
3
corroborated, is substantially a restatement of the common law on this point.1
The court in the instant case, in construing this statute, held that defendant's
spontaneous statements were sufficient corroboration. Thus the defendant
was convicted where the corpus delicti was proved entirely by his own statements. There was no other evidence. From a strictly logical point of view,
spontaneous statements are' "other evidence" which a jury might consider with
a confession in order to find the corpus delicti. Certainly spontaneous statements by third parties constitute such "other evidence."'1 4 But from the stand1. Reed v. State, 201 Ga. 789, 41 S.E.2d 426 (1947) ; State v. Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68,
199 Pac. 647, 17 A.L.R. 902 (1921) ; State v. Marcy, 189 Wash. 620, 66 P.2d 846 (1937).
2. Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79 (1941); 14 AM. JuR., Crininal
Law § 6 (1938).
3. Williamson v. State, 28 Ala. App. 455, 186 So. 785 (1939) ; Reed v. State, 201
Ga. 789, 41 S.E.2d 426 (1947).
4. Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 27 Sup. Ct. 456, 51 L. Ed. 722 (1907);
Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 158 P.2d 447, 159 A.L.R. 509 (1945); State v.
Stewart, 231 Iowa 585, 1 N.W.2d 626 (1942).
5. Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 127 A.L.R. 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; State
v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103 So. 278, 40 A.L.R. 458 (1925); 20 Am. JuR., Evidence §
1233 (1939).
6. Williams v. State, 125 Ga. 741, 54 S.E. 661 (1906) ; Dunn v. State, 34 Tex. Crim.
App. 257, 30 S.W. 227, 53 Am. St. Rep. 714 (1895).
7. Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 127 A.L.R. 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; 20 AM.
JuR., Evidence § 1233 (1939).
8. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 1072 (11th ed. 1935).
9. Bergen v. People, 17 II. 425 (1856).
10. 20 Am. Ju., Evidence § 1234 (1939).
11. People v. Bausell, 18 Cal. App.2d 15, 62 P.2d 774 (1936) ; 32 COL. L. REV. 378
(1932) ; 29 VA. L. RE. 1070 (1943).
12. IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.7 (1949).
13. State v. Webb, 239 Iowa 693, 31 N.W.2d 337 (1948).
14. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1755 (3d ed. 1940).
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point of the theory and policy behind the rule requiring corroboration, defendant's spontaneous statements would not seem to be sufficient corroboration. No cases on the precise point have been found. In one case defendant's
self-contradictory testimony was held sufficient corroboration. 15 In another
case it was held, with a vigorous dissent, that admissions to a magistrate
were sufficient corroboration. 16 But in a widely discussed case, Gulotta v.
United States,' it was held that admissions of the defendant were not sufficient corroboration. And in an arson case it was held that defendant's confession and other admissions were not enough to support a conviction. 8
The problem raised by the instant case involves two conflicting considerations. On the one hand there is the policy behind the rule itself-to prevent a
defendant from being convicted solely on the strength of his own words, for
there is a danger that no crime exists. 19 On the other hand, a defendant who
admits having committed a crime which seems clearly to have occurred
ought not to escape punishment merely because of a technicality.20 Although
Wigmore takes the position that the policy for requiring corroboration is
questionable, 21 and there seems to be a trend toward allowing corroborative
evidence of the slightest kind,2 2 the overwhelming majority of the courts and
writers believe that this policy has a sound basis. The rule is so entrenched in
American legal thought that immediate change is unlikely.

FEDERAL COURTS-VENUE-USE OF STATE NONRESIDENT
STATUTE TO IMPLY WAIVER

MOTORIST

Plaintiffs, residents of Texas, were injured in an automobile accident in
Tennessee. Defendants were residents of West Virginia. Under the Tennessee
nonresident motorist statute,' defendants were amenable to service of process
in Tennessee. Plaintiffs brought action in the federal district court in Tennessee, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, and defendants filed a
motion for dismissal because of improper venue. 2 Held, dismissed for improper venue. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that a nonresident
15. Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943), 29 VA. L. REV. 1070,
16. State v. McClain, 208 Minn. 91, 292 N.W. 753 (1940) ; the dissent brought out
that the only evidence of the corpus delicti was two confessions, one corroborated by
the other.
17. 113 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1940), 26 IOWA L. REV. 130.
18. State v. McLarne, 128 Minn. 163, 150 NAV. 787 (1915).
19. Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 425 (1856); 20 A-m. JUR., Evidence 1086 (1939) ; 1
GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 294 (15th ed., Crosweld, 1892); Note, 21 MICH. L. REV. 339
(1923).
20. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 395 (3d ed. 1940) ; 32 COL. L. REv. 378 (1932).
22. See note 11 supra.
21. 7 WXIGORaE, EVIDENCE 395 (3d ed. 1940).
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8671 (Williams Supp. 1950).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (a) (1950) limits venue in diversity cases to the district where
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. See note 13 infra.
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motorist, by using the highways of the state, consents to be sued in the courts
of the state, including the federal courts, and thus Waives his right to object
to the venue. Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tenn. 1950).
Although the forms vary somewhat, nonresident motorist statutes have
been adopted in each of the 48 states and the District of Columbia.3 Basically
these statutes provide that the use of state highways by a nonresident owner
or operator of an automobile shall be deemed the equivalent of an appointment
of a designated state official as agent of the nonresident to accept service of
process in any action growing out of such use of the highways. 4 The validity
of these statutes now seems beyond question.5 Of course, the extent of their
application depends upon the specific terms of each statute, but it has been
held that they may operate for the benefit not only of resident plaintiffs but of
nonresident plaintiffs as well, 6 and may apply equally to defendants who are
7
residents of other states and those who are residents of other countries.
Furthermore, they subject the nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of
3. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 199 (1940); Aiz. CODE ANN. § 66-226 (1939); ARK.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 341 (1947) ; CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 404 (Supp. 1945) ; COLO. STAT.
ANN. c.16, § 48(1) (Supp. 1950); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 7779 (1949); DEL. REV.
CODE § 4590 (1935) ; D.C. CODE § 40-403 (1940) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.29" (Supp. 1950) ;
GA. CODE ANN. § 68-801 (Supp. 1947) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 49, § 1202 (1947) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. c.95%, § 23 (1950); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1043 (Burns Supp. 1949); IowA
CODE ANN. § 321.498 (1949) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-401 (1935) ; Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 188.020 (Baldwin 1943) ; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5296 (1939) ; ME. REV. STAT. C.19,
§ 59 (1944); MD. AIiN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 56, § 188 (1939); MASS. ANN. LAWS
c.90, § 3A (1946); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1701 (Supp. 1947); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
170.55 (Supp. 1950); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9363 (Supp. 1950); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 8410.1 (West 1943); MONT. RIv. CODES ANN. § 53-202 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §
25-530 (Cum. Supp. 1949); NEv. Comp. LAws ANN. § 4441.01 (Supp. 1941); N.H.
REV. LAWS c.116, § 42 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-2 (Supp. 1950); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 68-1003 (1941); N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 52 (Supp. 1950); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-105 (1943); N.D. REv. CODE § 28-0611 (1943); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 6308-1 (1945); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 391 (1941); ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 115128b (Supp. 1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1201 (1939); R.I. GEN. LAWS c.103 § 1
(1938) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 437 (1942) ; S.D. CODE § 33.0809 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 8671 (Williams Supp. 1950); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (1950); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-13-12 (1943); VT. REv. STAT. § 10,062 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. §
8-67.1 (Supp. 1950); WASH. CODE § 295-111 (Pierce 1943); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
5555(1) (1949); Wis. STAT. § 85.05(3) (1949); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101
(1945).
4. See Culp, Process in Actions againsi Non-Resident Motorists, 32

MICH. L. REv.
325 (1934) ; Culp, Recent Developments in Actions against Nonresident Motorists, 37
MI H. L. REv. 58 (1938); Scott, Hess and Pawloski Carry On, 64 HARv. L. REv. 98
(1950) ; Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1926) ;
Tapley, Jurisdictionand the Non-Resident Motorist, 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 278 (1939);

Notes, 138 A.L.R. 1464 (1942), 125 A.L.R. 457 (1940), 96 A.L.R. 594 (1935), 82 A.L.R.
768 (1933), 42 ILL. L. REv. 780, 789-90 (1948), 20 IoWA L. REv. 654 (1935).
5. The leading case, upholding the constitutionality of the Massachusetts nonresident
motorist statute, is Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091
(1927). Cf. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916) ;
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446 (1928). See 9 Br.ASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 5913 (Perm. ed. 1941); 15-16 HUDDY,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 82 (9th ed. 1931) ; Notes, 99 A.L.R. 130 (1935), 57
A.L.R. 1239 (1928), 35 A.L.R. 951 (1925).

6. Neff v. Hindman, 77 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1948) (Pennsylvania nonresident

motorist statute).

7. Lulevitch v. Hill, 82 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (defendant a resident of

Canada),
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both the state courts and the federal courts located in the state where the
accident occurred. 8
But to say that a particular court has acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant does not therewith solve the separate problem of venue,9 which
involves a personal privilege of the defendant that the case be tried only in
certain localities.' 0 It is well settled that a defendant may waive this privilege.1 '
In cases originally brought in a state court and removed by the defendant to
the federal court, venue is properly laid in the district where that state court
is located, even though such venue would have been improper if the plaintiff
had brought the action originally in that federal court.12 On the other hand,
the venue of actions originally brought in a federal court is governed by
section 1391 of the Judicial Code, 13 which, roughly speaking, restricts venue
to the districts in which the parties reside. Under an earlier statute,14 a
corporate defendant was given the same venue privilege as was an individual
defendant, until the famous Neirbo rule was announced by the Supreme
Court in 1939.15 In the Neirbo case it was held that a foreign corporation
8. See, e.g., Zavis v. Warren, 35 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Wis. 1940) ; Carby v. Greco,

31 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Ky. 1940); Devier v. George Cole Motor Co., 27 F. Supp.

978 (W.D. Va. 1939) ; Clancy v. Balacier, 27 F. Supp.867 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ; O'Donnell
v. Slade. 5 F. Supp. 265 (M.D. Pa. 1933). 9 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOILE
LAW § 5821 (Perm. ed. 1941). Cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187, 67 Sup. Ct
657, 91 L. Ed. 832 (1947) : "For purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is, 'in
effect, only another court of the State.'"
9. "It is only after the question of the jurisdiction of this court is answered in the
affirmative that the question of venue ever arises." DoRiE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE 477 (1928). See also 9 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 5811
(Perm. ed. 1941).
10. DowE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 116 (1928).
11. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 179,
49 Sup. Ct 98, 73 L. Ed. 252 (1929) ; Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385, 44
Sup. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748 (1924). "Unless the litigant himself specially raises the
question [of venue], it is not before the court, for the judge cannot, of his own motion,
either raise or decide the question, even though the venue is manifestly improper."
DoBIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 478 (1928). See also MONTGOMERY,
MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 136 (4th ed. 1942).
12. The leading case is Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 260 U.S. 653, 43 Sup. Ct. 230,
67 L. Ed. 443 (1923). See DowE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 124 (1928).
The rule applies to actions brought under a nonresident motorist statute. Peeples v.
Ramspacher, 29 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
13. "(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
"(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as
otherwise provided by law.
"(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
"(d) An alien may be sued in any district." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (1950).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1946).
15. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 84
L. Ed. 167 (1939); cf. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 24 L. Ed. 853 (1878).
For discussions of the Neirbo case, see Levin, Federal Venue in Actions Against Corporations, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 92 (1940); Notes, 53 HARv. L. REv. 660 (1940), 42 ILL. L.
REV. 780 (1948), 38 Micir. L. REv. 1047 (1940); 25 CORNELL L.Q. 291 (1940); 18
N.C.L. REv. 232 (1940); 2 VAND. L. REv. 481 (1949).
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which, under state law as a requirement for the privilege of doing business
in the state, appoints an agent within the state to accept service of process,
thereby consents to be sued in the courts of the state, including the federal
courts, and thus waives its right to raise the objection of improper venue.
Subsequently, the rule was extended to apply to all manner of cases involving
17
foreign corporations, 6 until the new venue provisions of section 1391 (c)
eliminated the necessity of invoking the Neirbo rule by greatly restricting
the privilege accorded to corporate defendants.
The theory of the Neirbo decision, however, is broad enough to extend
beyond its mere application to foreign corporations. It has been applied to
individual defendants who, under state law as a requirement for doing business under a fictitious name, have appointed an agent to accept service of
process;18 and on repeated occasions it has been applied to nonresident
motorists. 19 In these latter cases, the consent and waiver are found not in the
actual appointment of a resident agent which the state law requires, but in
the use of state highways by the nonresident-which use the state law makes
operate as an appointment of a resident agent. The results have sometimes
been startling. For example, in Steele v. Dennis, 20 even though the court's
jurisdiction over the defendant had been acquired by personal service upon
him within the state, it was held that his act of using the highways had constituted a consent by him to be sued in the state and consequently a waiver
of his right to object so to be sued. 2' Thus it would seem that quite independently of establishing a machinery for obtaining service of process on a
nonresident motorist, these statutes create a situation whereby the mere
act of using the highways becomes a consent and waiver. 22 On the other
16. E.g., Roger v. A. H. Bull & Co., 170 F2d 664 (2d Cir. 1948), 2 VAND. L. REv.
481 (1949) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Knott Corp. v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199 (4th
Cir. 1947), 61 HARV. L. REv. 723 (1948), 33 VA. L. REV. 812 (1947); Shapiro v.

Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 155 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1946) (Federal Motor Carriers
Act); Dean v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 72 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. La. 1947) ; Vogel v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 36 F. Supp. 74 (D. Md. 1940) (patent case); Bennett v.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 33 F. Supp. 871 (D. Md. 1940) (Jones Act) ; International Union v. Tennessee Copper Co., 31 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) (federal
question case). See Note, The Aftermath of the Neirbo Case, 42 ILL. L. REv. 780 (1948).
17. See note 13 supra.
18. Surclo Mfg. Co. v. Dunlap, 76 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
19. Kostamo v. Brorby, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2409 (U.S.D.C., D. Neb. 1951); Burnett
v. Swenson, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2312 (U.S.D.C., W.D. Okla., 1951); Urso v. Scales, 90
F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1950);
Steele v. Dennis, 62 F. Supp. 73 (D. Md. 1945) ; Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708&
(E.D.S.C. 1943) ; Andrews v. Joseph Cohen & Sons, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Texas
1941); Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941); cf. Williams v.
James, 34 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. La. 1940). Contra: Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co.,
183 F.2d 53 (Ist Cir. 1950).
20. 62 F. Supp. 73 (D. Md. 1945).
21. Five years later, in considering hypothetically an identical situation, Professor
Scott seems to have had no difficulty in concluding that "the action could not be maintained in the federal court if the defendant had been served personally in the state."
Scott, Hess and Pawloski Carry On, 64 HARv. L. REv. 98, 102 (1950). Professor Scott
failed to appreciate the extent to which a fiction may be carried.
22. Limited, of course, to actions arising from such use of the highways.
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hand, in Blunda v. Craig,23 involving the Missouri nonresident motorist
statute, which contains a provision that any action under the statute must be
brought in the county where the accident occurred, 24 it was held that this
provision was not controlling on federal courts, and the action could be maintained in a federal district other than that including the county where the
accident occurred. It would seem to follow that if state venue provisions do
not limit the consent, and if federal venue provisions are waived by the consent, then state venue provisions must also be waived by the consent. Yet such
an argument apparently has never been credited by state courts.2 Its absurdity is particularly emphasized by nonresident motorist statutes which
20
themselves contain venue provisions.
The federal venue privilege is given by Congress, and ought not to be
taken away by act of a state legislature. 27 The court in the instant case, and
the court in the recent case of Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co., 28 recognized
this principle in refusing to apply the Neirbo rule to nonresident motorists. 2
The distinction which justifies such refusal is that the consent found in the
Neirbo case in an actual appointment by a corporation of an agent for service
of process cannot be found in any act of the motorist as such, but only in the
significance which state law attaches to an act of the motorist-that is, his
use of state highways.30 That the distinction was appreciated by Mr. Justice
23. 74 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
24. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8410.11 (West Supp. 1950).
25. E.g., Carroll v. Matthews, 172 Tenn. 590, 113 S.W.2d 742 (1938) ; cf. Carter
v. Schackne, 173 Tenn. 44, 114 S.W.2d 787 (1938) ; see Turner v. Manos, 291 Ky. 431,
164 S.W.2d 962, 963-64 (1942) ("It should also be remembered that if we should hold
that the service in this case was in strict accord with the statute and reverse the judgment, then upon the filing of the mandate and setting the judgment aside defendant could
raise in the proper manner the question of proper venue, and when done the action would
have to be dismissed; so that, after all, no beneficial result to plaintiff would be accomplished by the reversal"). See 9 BLAStFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOoDiILE LAW
§ 5817 (Perm. ed. 1941); Note, 115 A.L.R. 893 (1938).
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 65-803 (Supp. 1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1043 (Burns
Supp. 1949); IOwA CODE ANN. § 321.507 (1949); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9363 (Supp.
1950); Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 8410.11 (West Supp. 1950); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 400
(1941) ; Wyo. Comn'. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101 (1945).
27. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes' statement, "Whatever springes the State may set for
those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of
Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name
of local practice." Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24, 44 Sup. Ct. 13, 68 L. Ed. 143
(1923).
28. 183 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950).
29. Any hope that these two cases herald a new, more logical trend would seem to
be dispelled by two very recent district court decisions which apply the Neirbo rule to
nonresident motorists, specifically rejecting the logic of the Fischbach decision. Kostamo
v. Brorby, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2409 (U.S.D.C., D. Neb., Feb. 21, 1951); Burnett v.
Swenson, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2312 (U.S.D.C., W.D. Okla., Jan. 8, 1951).
30. Prior to the enactment of the new venue provision as to corporations, there
was at least one case applying the Neirbo rule in the case of a foreign corporation to an

agent designated by statute. Knott Corp. v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947), 61 HARV. L. Ray. 723 (1948), 33 VA. L. REV. 812 (1947).
But the holding relied strongly on the application of the rule in nonresident motorist
cases. The usual holding as to foreign corporations was that no waiver would be implied unless the agent had actually been appointed by the corporation. See, e.g., Moss v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 149 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947) ;

19511

RECENT CASES

Frankfurter in writing the majority opinion in the Neirbo case is indicated
by his statement that "In finding an actual consent by Bethlehem to be sued
in the courts of New York, federal as well as state, we are not subjecting
'3
federal procedure to the requirements of New York law. '

GIFT TAXES-TRANSFER MADE UNDER DIVORCE DECREE INCORPORATING PREDIVORCE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT-EFFECT OF PROVISION
IN SETTLEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE BINDING REGARDLESS OF
TERMS OF DIVORCE DECREE
In contemplation of divorce the taxpayer and her husband entered into a
property settlement which was contingent upon the entry of a decree of
absolute divorce. The terms of the agreement, however, were to be effective
regardless of the settlement imposed upon the parties by the decree. The
decree as entered incorporated the contract without change. Pursuant thereto
the taxpayer transferred property exceeding in value by $107,000 that received by her; the Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer for
gift taxes on the excess. The Tax Court expunged the deficiency, and the
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the transfer was not based
solely on the divorce decree. Held (5-4),' reversed. The transfer was not
voluntary but was based on an obligation imposed by law. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 71 Sup. Ct. 181 (1950).2
The federal estate tax and the federal gift tax are to be construed ilf
pariv ateria since the purpose of the gift tax is to prevent the tax-free depletion of one's estate during his life. 3 The estate tax provides that claims
against the estate may be deducted from the gross estate; but the deductions
for such claims, when founded upon a promise or agreement, are limited to
the extent that they were contracted for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth." The statute expressly provides that a relinquishment of marital rights is not to any extent a consideration in money or
money's worth. The gift tax provides that when property is transferred for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,
the amount by which the value of the property exceeds the consideration concf. Note, 48 ILL. L. REv. 780, 784-85 (1948) ; 2 VAND. L. RFv. 481, 482 (1949). However, these cases usually involved statutes requiring a separate act of appointment.
31. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 175, 60 Sup. Ct. 153,
84 L. Ed. 167 (1939).
1. Majority opinion by Douglas, J. (Clark, Jackson and Reed, J.., and Vinson, C.J.,
concurring); dissenting opinion by Frankfurter, J. (Black, Burton and Minton, JJ.,
concurring).
2. For proceedings in the lower courts see 10 T.C. 741 (1948) and 178 F.2d 861 (2d
Cir. 1949).
3. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 65 Sup. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963 (1945) ; Comm'r
v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 89 L. Ed. 958 (1945).
4. INT. REV. CODE § 812 (b).
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stitutes a gift.5 By a process of judicial interpretation the estate tax provision
regarding release of marital rights has been read into the gift tax statute,
with the result that the relinquishment of marital rights in property is not
considered adequate and full consideration under the gift tax statute.0
In the past, in cases involving transfers arising out of divorce proceedings, the discussion has centered around the question of consideration. There
was disagreement between the Tax Court and the Treasury with regard to
whether the release of marital rights arising out of predivorce agreements
later incorporated into the decree constitutes consideration.7 The Treasury
insisted that it did not; the Tax Court consistently took the view that the
proximity to the divorce proceedings gave the transfers the characteristics
of arm's length business transactions made without any donative intent,8 and
thus under the Treasury Regulations such transfers were not subject to the
gift" tax. 9 In 1946 the Treasury made a partial concession in recognizing
the release of support rights, even when founded upon an agreement, as
adequate consideration, but reaffirmed its position that the release of other
marital rights would not constitute consideration.? ° This was consistent with
the Wemyss case," which settled the matter as to antenuptial agreements.
Since only voluntary transfers come within the purview of the gift tax
statute,'2 it is conceded that a transfer based solely upon a divorce decree,
being in satisfaction of an obligation imposed by law, is not a taxable gift. 13
The primary question, then, in cases involving a predivorce agreement later
5. Id. § 1002.

6. Merrill v. Fabs, 324 U.S. 308, 65 Sup. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963 (1945).
7. See Note, 1 M~x~i L.Q. 40 (1947).
8. See, e.g., Josephine S. Barnard, 9 T.C. 61 (1947), rev'd, 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.

1949); Clarence B. Mitchell, 6 T.C. 159 (1946); Matthew Lahti, 6 T.C. 7 (1946);
Edmund C. Converse, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945), affd, 163 F.2d 131, 174 A.L.R. 199 (2d Cir.
1947) ; Herbert Jones, 1 T.C. 1207 (1943). But cf. Clarissa H. Thomson, 16 P-H 1947
TC MEm. DEC. f1 47,194 (1947). The instant case somewhat refutes this view. "This
transaction is not 'in the ordinary course of business' in any conventional sense. Few
transactions between husband and wife ever would be; and those under the aegis or a
divorce court are not. But if two partners on dissolution of the firm entered into a
transaction of this character . . . there would seem to be no doubt that the unscrambling
of the business interests would satisfy the spirit of the Regulations. No reason is apparent why husband and wife should be under a heavier handicap absent a statute which
brings all marital property settlements under the gift tax." 340 U.S. at 112.
9. 340 U.S. at 112, n.8, citing U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8: "However, a sale,
exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a
transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will
be considered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
10. E.T. 19, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 166. This E.T. applied to both the estate tax and
the gift tax.
11. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 65 Sup. Ct. 652, 89 L. Ed. 958 (1945).
12. Comm'r v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131, 174 A.L.R. 199 (2d Cir. 1947), affrmling
5 T.C. 1014 (1945); Edward B. McLean, 11 T.C. 543 (1948); Albert V. Moore, 10
T.C. 393 (1948); Junius R. Judson, 16 P-H 1947 TC Mzm. DEc. 1 47,050 (1947);
Long, What Is New in Handling The Tax Phases of Marriage; Divorce; Anlitony;
Minor's Income; Decedent's Income in SIXTH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAxATioN 1061,
1070 (N.Y.U. 1948). See Herbert Jones, 1 T.C. 1207 (1943).
13. "Even the Commissioner concedes that that result would be correct in case the
property settlement was litigated in the divorce action." 340 U.S. at 110.
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incorporated into a divorce decree emerges not as one of consideration but
whether the transfer is based upon the divorce decree or upon the predivorce
agreement.
Commissioner v. Maresi,'4 an estate tax case, held that a claim by a
divorced wife was deductible from the gross estate of the decedent because the
claim was based upon the decree of divorce which adopted a previous agreement made by the parties. The theory of the holding was that the decree
transformed the obligation from a contractual duty to a judicially imposed
duty; hence the claim ceased to be based upon a promise or agreement.' 5
Commissioner v. Converse,"6 a gift tax case, relying heavily upon the Maresi
case, held that a transfer made pursuant to a divorce decree was not taxable
as a gift even though there was a prior agreement. The nub of the holding
was that if the taxpayer had died, the claim would have been deductible from
his gross estate under the holding of the Maresi case.
The problem of the instant case involves not a mere predivorce agreement but an agreement providing that its terms were to survive the decree,
which agreement was incorporated into the decree. The court of appeals and
the minority in the instant case took the position that since both the agreement and the decree provided that the agreement was to survive the decree,
the transfer was not made solely pursuant to the decree and hence should be
taxable. The view of the majority, however, in holding the transfer nontaxable
even though not made solely pursuant to the decree, does not discourage
compromise agreements. The essence of the holding is that if there is a predivorce agreement conditional upon an absolute divorce and providing for
submission of the agreement to the court for inclusion in the decree if the
court so orders, then to the extent that the court incorporates it in the decree,
transfers made pursuant to the decree will not be subject to the gift tax; to
the extent, however, that the court does not approve the agreement, it seems
that any transfers required by the agreement will be subject to the terms of .the
gift tax. To be perfectly safe from the gift tax, the predivorce agreement
should be contingent not only upon an absolute divorce but also upon approval
of its terms by the court.1 7
14. 156 F2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946), affirming 6 T.C. 582 (1946). Accord, Comm'r v.

State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618, 142 A.L.R. 943 (1st Cir. 1942) ; Fleming v. Yoke,
53 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. W. Va. 1944), affd per curiam, 145 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1944).
15. Rudick, Marriage, Divorce and Taxes, 2 TAX L. REv. 123, 160 (1947) ; 48 COL.
L. REv. 152 (1948).
16. 163 F.2d 131, 174 A.L.R. 199 (2d Cir. 1947), afflirmning 5 T.C. 1014 (1945).
17. In George C. McMurtry, 4 PH 1951 FED. TAX SERV. f[74.258 (T.C. 1951), the
Tax Court distinguished the instant case on the grounds that in the McMurtry case the predivorce agreement was not contingent upon the divorce and that it did not provide for
submission of the agreement to the divorce court for ratification.
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INSURANCE-NOTICE TO AGENT REPRESENTING TWO INSURERSESTOPPEL PREVENTING COMPANY SECONDARILY LIABLE FROM
CLAIMING AGAINST COMPANY PRIMARILY LIABLE
A single agent, who represented both plaintiff and defendant insurance
companies, sold to the insured a general liability policy issued by defendant
company and one for "excess insurance over any other valid and collectible
insurance available to the insured" issued by plaintiff company. The insured
reported an accident within the coverage of both policies to the agent, who
notified only the plaintiff company. In ignorance of other insurance, plaintiff
company assumed the liability and retained attorneys to defend the suit
brought against the insured. Plaintiff learned of the other insurance shortly
before trial and agreed with defendant insurer that plaintiff should continue
defense of the suit and pay any judgment, without prejudice to the existing
rights of either company. Plaintiff paid a judgment rendered against the
insured and sued to recover from defendant company. Defendant denied
liability on the grounds that (1) the insured had not given it proper notice,
and (2) plaintiff was estopped to deny its own liability. Held (3-2), judgment
for defendant affirmed. Plaintiff is estopped to deny the liability it had assumed and cannot recover from the other insurer, even though the latter
conceded that the liability in question fell within the coverage of its policy.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surely Co., 60 S.E.2d 876 (Va.
1950).
In the absence of a controlling statute, the parties to an insurance contract may make any reasonable provision for notice and proof of loss.' If
the policy carries a provision regarding notice and proof of loss, compliance
therewith is determined upon the facts in each case.2 If the policy does not
provide to whom notice should be given, notification to an agent of the cor1. 29 Am. JUR., Insurance § 1100 (1940) ; Note, 76 A.L.R. 23, 28 (1932) ; McClendon,
Public Liability Insurance: The Injured Person's Right of Recovery When the Policy
Holder Fails to Give Immediate Notice to the Insurer, 10 TULANE L. REV. 69 (1935)
Note, 17 ICAN. CITY L. REv. 63 (1949).
2. E.g., Georgia Life Ins. Co v. Otter Creek Coal Co., 67 Ind. App. 277, 119 N.E.
151 (1918) (notice to agent sufficient where insured had no knowledge of revocation
of agency); Mandell v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 170 Mass. 173, 49 N.E. 110, 64 Am. St.
Rep. 291 (1898) (written notice made where letter addressed to agent came to home
office of insurer) ; Vandervliet v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 146, 176 N.W. 574
(1920) (general agent and one with authority to countersign has authority to receive
notice) ; C.S. Brackett & Co. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 140 Minn.
271, 167 N.VWT. 798 (1918); Rogers v. Western Indemnity Co., 189 Mo. App. 82, 173
S.W. 1087 (1915) (notice to general agent not sufficient where required to give notice to
agent countersigning) ; Pringle v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 123 Mo. App. 710, 101 S.W. 130
(1907) (notice to broker not sufficient); Lehrhoff v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 101
N.J.L. 375, 128 Atl. 245 (1925) (oral notification to employee at home office not
sufficient unless employee was an agent) ; State Automobile Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Friedman,
122 Ohio St. 334, 171 N.E. 591 (1930) (giving notice to former agent not enough but
notice to cashier is) ; Keyes v. Continental Cas. Co., 121 Pa. Super. 359, 183 Atl. 672
(1936) (not proper notice where additional insurer notifies primary insurer); 6 LA.
L. REv. 729 (1946).
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pany has been held sufficient. 3 A mistake by the insured as to which of his
several policies covers the loss is not a sufficient excuse for his failure to
notify the proper insurer as required by the terms of his policy. 4 On the
other hand, even where the agent mistakenly forwards the notice to a stranger
insurance company,5 notice given to the proper agent is generally imputed to
the insurer.6 Where the agent receiving notice is also the agent of other
insurance companies, a single notice to such agent has been held sufficient to
7
impute knowledge to the other companies which are separately liable.
In an action upon a policy, the insurer may be estopped to deny liability
if, under the terms of the policy, it has defended a suit brought against its
insured. 8 To be estopped the insurer must either have made no reservation
of its rights, or such reservation must have been inadequate. 9 An essential
element of the estoppel is that the insured must have been injured as a result
of the action of the insurer, 10 although some jurisdictions have held that
defense of the suit by the insurer creates a presumption that the insured's
position has been prejudiced." It seems that the theory of estoppel should
3. American Cas. Co. v. Purcella, 163 Md. 434, 163 Atl. 870 (1933).
4. Jefferson Realty Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 149 Ky. 741, 149
S.W. 1011 (1912) ; Reina v. United States Cas. Co., 228 App. Div. 108, 239 N.Y. Supp.

196 (1st Dep't 1930); Sherwood Ice Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 40 R.I. 268, 100
Atl. 572 (1917); 29 Am. JUR., Insurance § 1114 (1940).
5. Toub v. Home Indemnity Co., 116 N.J.L. 287, 183 Atl. 827 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
6. 16 APPLEMAN, INsURA cE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9101 (1944); 2 Coucu,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 547, 547(a) (1929). See Merrill, Unforgettable
Knowledge, 34 MIcH. L. REv. 474 (1936); Merrill, The Anatomy of Notice, 3 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 417 (1936); Seavey, Notice Through an Agent, 65 U. OF PA. L. REv.
1 (1916).
7. Mechanic Ins. Co. v. Claunch, 158 Ark. 191, 249 S.W. 588 (1923); Benero v.

Insurance Companies, 65 Cal. 386, 4 Pac. 382 (1884) ; Kelley v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 275 Ill. App. 112 (1934).

8. See Note, 81 A.L.R. 1326 (1932); 16 B.U.L. REv. 236 (1936); 13 Fo". L.

REv. 248 (1944); 29 ILL. L. REv. 115 (1934); 26 ILL. L. REv.90 (1931) ; 24 TEx. L.
REV. 504 (1946); 65 U.S.L. Rv. 238 (1931).
9. E.g., Meyers v. Continental Cas. Co., 12 F.2d. 52 (8th Cir. 1926); Employers'
Liability Assurance Corp. v. Chicago & B.M. Coal & Coke Co., 141 Fed. 962 (7th Cir.

1905); Columbian Three Color Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 183 Ill. App. 384 (1913);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 208 Ky. 429, 271 S.W. 444, 43 A.L.R.
318 (1925); Sargent Mfg. Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 165 Mich. 87, 130 N.W. 211,
34 L.R.A. (N.s.) 491 (1911); Cowell v. Employers' Indemnity Corp., 326 Mo. 1103,
34 S.W.2d 705 (1930); Ford Hospital v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 106 Neb. 311, 183 N.W.
656 (1921) ; 29 ILL. L. Rlv. 115 (1934). For a complete discussion of waiver or estoppel
see Note, 81 A.L.R. 1326 (1932).
10. E.g., Lunt v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 261 Mass. 469, 159 N.E. 461 (1928) ; Kitsap
County Transp. Co. v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., 67 Wash. 297, 121 Pac. 457 (1912);
J. S. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 159 Wis. 627, 150 N.W. 991 (1915).
The elements of a complete estoppel are: "(1) A position of authority assumed by
[insurer] under color of right; (2) submission to and reliance upon that assumption by
[insured]; and (3) injury suffered by [insured] as a proximate consequence of such
submission and reliance." Belt Automobile Indemnity Ass'n v. Ensley Transfer & Supply
Co., 211 Ala. 84, 99 So. 787, 790 (1924). "[T]here is no estoppel unless [insured)
has been misled and injured." American Cereal Co. v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co.,
211 Fed. 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1914).
11. E.g., Tozer v. Ocean Acc. & Guaranty Corp., 99 Minn. 290, 109 N.W. 410

(1906); Royle Mining Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 126 Mo. App. 104, 103 S.W. 1098
(1907) ; Malley v. American Indemnity Corp., 297 Pa. 216, 146 Atf. 571, 81 A.L.R. 1322
(1929). However, the motive of the insurer in defending the suit is immaterial. Empire
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be inappropriate as between insurers primarily and secondarily liable. If a
party secondarily liable pays a judgment, it may be subrogated to the rights
of the judgment creditor and may recover from the party primarily liable ;12
and by analogy this principle would seem to apply where the parties are insurers.
If. the court in the instant case had determined the liability of the defendant company to the insured under the above rules, it would probably
have found that the defendant was liable to the insured for the judgment
rendered against it. Though notice of the accident was required, the notice
given to the agent generally should be sufficient. If the mistake had been on
the part of the insured alone, the defendant could have escaped liability; but
where the company's agent also erred, his knowledge would normally be imputed to the company, and the company's liability would follow unless it
could escape for other reasons.
The plaintiff in the instant case would probably have been estopped from
denying liability in a suit brought by the insured on the policy; but when the
judgment was rendered against the insured and was paid by the plaintiff,
the latter should be subrogated to the rights of the insured. The plaintiff
would thus step into the shoes of the insured and, since there was no
estoppel of the insured in relation to the defendant insurer, no estoppel
should exist as between the two insurers. Furthermore, the rights of the
defendant were not prejudiced; and the plaintiff had made an adequate reservation of its rights prior to defending the suit against the insured.

JURISDICTION-ATrACHMENT OF PROPERTY BELONGING TO NONRESIDENT-APPEARANCE BY OWNER AS BASIS FOR POWER
TO GRANT INJUNCTION AGAINST HIM
Sutherland, defendant in the present suit, a nonresident of Tennessee,
originally brought an action at law in the Tennessee circuit court to recover
funds allegedly converted by the bank, the present plaintiff. The bank then
attached the funds and brought this suit in chancery court to recover on a note
signed by Sutherland, as a member of a dissolved partnership, and to enjoin
him from continuing his action at law. Sutherland appeared specially and
filed a plea in abatement, asserting that the statute of limitations barred the
action on the note. The chancery court upheld his plea and entered judgment
in his favor, from which the bank appealed. Held (2-1), reversed; the statute
of limitations was tolled by the absence of Sutherland from the state. The bank
is entitled to recover the amount of the note to the extent of the property
State Surety Co. v. Pacific Nat. Lumber Co., 200 Fed. 224 (9th Cir. 1912) ; Oehme v.
Johnson, 181 Minn. 138, 231 N.W. 817, 81 A.L.R. 1308 (1930).
12. New York Cas. Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 108 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1939).
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attached, and the defendant will be enjoined from enforcing the judgment
which had been confessed in his action at law after the present action had
been started. Farmers State Bank v. Jones, 232 S.W.2d 658 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1949).
Courts have generally exercised their power over a res to enforce the
obligations of an absent owner; and, although the jurisdiction is over the res
alone, and the judgment is effective only to the extent of the res, the suit is in
i
form against the person and the jurisdiction is described as quasi in rem.
The normal method of acquiring jurisdiction in this manner is by attachment
2
or garnishment.
Once a court has acquired jurisdiction quasi in rem, the defendant is
faced with the alternatives of: (1) not appearing, (2) appearing generally
and pleading to the merits, or (3) appearing specially to challenge the jurisdiction of the court.3 If the defendant does not appear, he loses by default ;4 and
if he appears generally and pleads to the merits or asks for relief which
5
presupposes jurisdiction, the court acquires jurisdiction in personam. However, a special appearance to test the jurisdiction of the court will not generally
extend the power of the court beyond the limits of an action quasi in rem. 6
An appearance to contest the validity of the attachment is usually held to be
a special appearance, 7 although some courts hold otherwise." An appearance
to protect the defendant's rights in the property attached, or to challenge
the merit of the claim to the extent of the property attached, has also been
1. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106.1 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
70 (3d ed. 1949).
2. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 71 (3d ed. 1949).
3. See Frumer, Jurisdictionand Limited Appearance in New York: Dilemma of the

Nonresident Defendant, 18 FoRD. L. REv. 73 (1949).
4. As to the problem of judgment by default and res adjudicata, see GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71 (3d ed. 1949).
5. Campbell v. Murdock, 90 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Ohio 1950), 51 COL. L. REv. 242
(1951)

(motion to make more specific) ; Stecker v. Snyder, 118 Colo. 153, 193 P.2d 881

(1948); Wolf v. Timmons, 192 Ill. App. 121 (1915); Stringfellow v. Nowlin Bros.,
157 La. 683, 102 So. 869 (1925); Service Printing Co. v. Wallace, 179 Okla. 58, 64

P.2d 863 (1937); Notes, 129 A.L.R. 1240 (1940), 25 IowA L. REv. 329 (1940); 42
MICH. L. REv. 714 (1944).
6. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 197 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §
82 (1942). In some states a special appearance is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction

in personam. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct 9, 34 L. Ed. 604 (1890). See 97

U. OF PA. L. REv. 403 (1949).
7. E.g., Thompson.y. Terminal Shares Inc., 89 F2d 652 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied
sub nora. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Thompson, 302 U.S. 735 (1937) ; Dudley v. Peterson,
42 Ariz. 282, 25 P.2d 276 (1933) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Jackson, 181 Miss. 691, 179
So. 571 (1938) ; Hurst-Boillin Co. v. Kelly, 146 Tenn. 251, 240 S.W. 771 (1922) ; see
Smyth v. Moffett, 6 Tenn. App. 381 (E.S. 1927).
8. Roach v. Henry, 186 Ark. 884, "56 S.W2d 577 (1933) ; Johnson v; Holt's Adm'r,
235 Ky. 518, 31 S.W.2d 895 (1930); Gale v. Consolidated Bus & Equipment Co., 251
Wis. 642, 30 N.W.2d 84 (1948).
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considered a special appearance only ;9 but there is substantial authority to
the contrary. 10
The issue of the jurisdiction of either the chancery or the appellate court
to enter a personal judgment against the defendant was not raised in the
instant case, and the court gave no theory upon which it acted to enjoin the
defendant. To the contrary, the court said: "The result is that the complainant
is entitled to recover the amount due on the note to the extent of the fund
attached herein. There can be no personal judgment in that Sutherland entered his appearance specially to test the sufficiency of the attachment."" This
language indicates that the court did not intend to hold that the defendant
had pleaded to the merits, but rather to the contrary. If the court thus intends to hold that the jurisdiction is quasi in ren only, then the injunction
is inconsistent with this language.
There are two possible bases on which the court might have achieved
the same result. It could have held that it had jurisdiction in rent, with the
judgment of the circuit court as the res,12 in which case the decree should
have been that the judgment at law was void. Or, the court could have acquired jurisdiction in personam if it had held that the equity proceeding was
a continuation of the action at law. 13 This position would be somewhat
difficult to sustain, since the suit in equity was a new proceeding, not in the
nature of an appeal, and in Tennessee, chancery and circuit courts are separate
and distinct.1 4 However, if it were possible to consider the equity proceeding
as a continuation of the action at law, then the present court could have
issued the injunction as a valid exercise of its personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
9. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (6th Cir.
1922) ; Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

§§ 38-40 (1942).

10. Najdowski v. Ransford, 248 Mich. 465, 227 N.W. 769 (1929) ; Industrial Trust
Co. v. Rabinowitz, 65 R.I. 20, 13 A.2d 259 (1940) ; see Jos. Riedel Glass Works Inc. v.
Keegan, 43 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Maine 1942).
11. 232 S.W.2d at 665.
12. Britton v. Bryson, 216 Cal. 362, 14 P.2d 502 (1932) ; Sparrenberger v. District
Court, 66 Mont. 496, 214 Pac. 85 (1923) ; Parker v. Board, 187 Okla. 308, 102 P.2d 880
(1940). But cf. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Smott, 152 F.2d 667, 163 A.L.R. 498 (1945), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946); Des Moines Union Ry. Co. v. District Court, 170 Iowa
568, 153 N.W. 217 (1915); Fisher v. Evans, 25 Mo. App. 582 (1887); Moyer v. Koontz,
103 Wis. 22, 79 N.W. 50 (1899) ; see Bickerdike v. Allen, 157 Ill. 95, 41 N.E. 740, 741,
29 L.R.A. 78. (1895).
13. Michigan Trust Co.v.Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 33 Sup. Ct. 550, 57 L. Ed. 867 (1913);
Hanna v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 62 F.2d 139, 149 (8th Cir. 1932); Dickey v. Turner, 49
F.2d 998 (6th Cir. 1931) ; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 146 Fed. 994 (W.D. Texas 1906) ;
The Cortes Co. v. Thannhauser, 9 Fed. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1881) ; Reybine v. Kruse, 128
Fla. 278, 174 So. 720 (1937); Beck v. Koester, 79 Ind. 135 (1881); Ohlquist v.
Nordstrom, 143 Misc. 502, 257 N.Y. Supp. 711 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 188 N.E. 125
(1933) ; Carey v. Carey, 121 Pa. Super. 251, 183 Atl. 371 (1936).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10318, 10349 (Williams 1934).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-LIABILITY FOR
OMISSION TO ACT WHEN AFFIRMATIVE CONDUCT IS BEYOND
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Defendant telephone company occupied the second floor of a building,
immediately above plaintiff's store. The landlord, in order to repair the
plumbing in his living quarters at the rear of the second floor, directed defendant's operator to open a water faucet so that the air and water might
escape when he shut off the common water line. The operator, after receiving
notice that the faucet should be closed, negligently opened it further, and
plaintiff's storeroom was flooded when the water was later turned on. From
a directed verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Held, affirmed. Regardless
of whether or not the operator was acting within the scope of her employment
in opening the faucet, by so doing she created a situation requiring further
action by defendant to protect others; and her failure to close the faucet
after she became aware of the risk of leaving it open was conduct within
the scope of her employment. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Yates, 232
S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1950).
A master is liable for injuries resulting from the negligent conduct of a
servant within the scope of his employment ;" but before a negligent omission
to act, as in the instant case, will be such conduct, there first must be a duty
to act.2 Thus the master may be held for the failure of a servant to act where
the master owes a duty to third persons and the servant is expressly employed to perform this duty,3 or where the general nature of the work to be
performed gives rise to the servant's duty to protect others.4
May a servant's act outside the scope of his employment give rise to a
duty to act within the scope of his employment? The American Law Institute
suggests an affirmative answer,5 and most of the few cases directly in point
are in agreement. 6 For example, a carrier was held liable when a train con1. 2 MEcHEM, AGENCY § 1874 (2d ed. 1914) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 219 (1933).
2. Peter Piper Tailoring Co. v. Dobbin, 195 Mo. App. 435, 192 S.W. 1044 (1917);
2 MECHEm, AGENCY § 1874 (2d ed. 1914); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 232, comment a
(1933).
3. Kissenger v. New York & H.R.R., 56 N.Y. 538 (1874).
4. Simonton v. Loring, 68 Me. 164, 28 Am. Rep. 29 (1878) (occupant of upper
tenement liable for damage done when his servant accidentally left open a faucet, flooding lower tenement); Strong v. Woodrow Investing Co., 158 N.Y. Supp. 513 (1st
Dep't 1916) (landlord liable for damage to plaintiff's furniture when the building superintendent failed to comply with instructions and inspect plaintiff's apartment before turning on steam).
5. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 232 (1933). See FERSON, BASIS OF CONTRAcTS 280
(1949).
6. Linam v. Murphy, 232 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. 1950); Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry.,
70 N.H. 607, 50 Atl. 103 (1901); Chapman v. New York Central R.R., 33 N.Y. 369,
88 Am. Dec. 392 (1865); Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. v. Kassen, 49 Ohio St. 230, 31 N.E.
282 (1892); Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504 (1875).
Contra: Loyd v. Herrington, 143 Tex. 135, 182 S.W.2d 1003 (1944), reversing 178
S,W,2d 694 (Tex. Civ, App. 1944).
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ductor kissed a female passenger, there being a duty to protect her from the
whole world against such indignities. 7 So also, a railroad was held liable
when a laborer took down a set of bars along the right-of-way to let his own
team through and negligently failed to replace them, the laborer being under
a continuous duty to replace them.8 And when a flying instructor took over
the controls of a training plane from a student pilot and proceeded to "buzz"
various objects, his employers, under the duty of a carrier, were held liable
for injuries to the student sustained in the crash of the plane. 9 In each of
these cases, although the opinions do not clearly state the doctrine, the various
acts involved gave rise to the situation calling for affirmative action within the
scope of employment; and when the servant failed to take such action, liability
attached. 10
Even more clearly in the instant case did the operator's independent act 1 '
give rise to a duty to act within the scope of her employment. In opening the
faucet, defendant's operator created the duty to close it when necessary, since
defendant through its servant was bound to use ordinary care at all times
to prevent leakage.' 2 Damage resulted from the operator's omission to act
14
13
within the scope of her employment, and her master became liable.
7. Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504 (1875). But ei.

Castorina v. Rosen, 290 N.Y. 445, 49 N.E.2d 521 (1943).
8. Chapman v. New York Central R.R., 33 N.Y. 369, 88 Am. Dec. 392 (1865).
9. Linam v. Murphy, 232 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. 1950). See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 232, comment c (1933).
10. In Loyd v. Herrington, 178 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), an employee
of defendant's independent contractor, as a prank, attached a dynamite percussion cap
to the motor of his foreman's automobile. The cap failed to explode when the foreman
started the car, but plaintiff was injured by its explosion when he was checking the motor.
In holding defendant liable the court pointed out that placing the cap in the motor was
not within the scope of employment, but once the prank failed the employee was under a
duty to remove it. The supreme court refused to follow this reasoning and reversed,
holding that "the failure of the employees to recover the explosive from the motor prior
to the injury ... was but a continuation of the original prank...." 143 Tex. 135, 182
S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1944).
11. The court indicates that this act might have been within the scope of the
operator's employment but bases its decision on the assumption that it was not. 232

S.W.2d at 799.

12. Weinstein v. Barrasso, 139 Tenn. 593, 202 S.W. 920 (1918) ; 4 SHEARMAN AND
NEGLiGENcE § 803 (Rev. ed., Zipp, 1941). Being chargeable with the knowledge of the dangerous condition acquired by its operator, "it was the duty of the defendant to see that the water did not escape to the lower floor, even though the condition making this possible was due to a fault not attributable to it." 232 S.W.2d at 799.
13. "Whatever may be true with respect to the authority of the operator to open
the faucet . . . , it cannot be said that her failure to close it after she became aware of
the risk of leaving it open was not within the scope of the duties imposed upon her by the
defendant." 232 S.W2d at 800.
14. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 232, comment d (1933).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-TORT ACTION WITH COMMON LAW
DEFENSES ABROGATED BY STATUTE-UABILITY OF EMPLOYER
TO VICE PRINCIPAL FOR NEGLIGENCE OF SUBORDINATE
EMPLOYEE
Plaintiff, employed as a foreman by defendant mining company, sought
to recover for injuries received when defendant's bus, used to carry employees to and from work, was negligently wrecked by the driver, another
employee. The evidence showed plaintiff was placed in charge of the bus
with authority to control the driver. The action was at common law since
the employer had elected not to operate under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, but the common law defenses had been abrogated by a provision of
this act.' Held, no recovery because the plaintiff was a vice principal. Pike-

ville Fuel Co. v. Marsh, 232 S.W.2d 789 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1948).
Common law tort actions by a servant against a master were subject to
the defenses of assumption of risk, the fellow servant rule and contributory
negligence. Under the so-called fellow servant rule, a master was not liable to a
servant for injuries caused by the negligence of another servant in common
employment. 2 In order to escape the harshness of this rule, the courts gradually
developed a series of exceptions. Thus, recovery was allowed if the master
had failed to hire a competent fellow servant,3 if the negligent fellow servant
was exercising a nondelegable duty,4 if the negligent employee was hired in a
6
different department, 5 or if the negligent employee was a vice principal.
1. The Tennessee act, coercive and not compulsory in nature, provides that where
both the employer and employee elect not to proceed under the act, the action is the qame
as at common law. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6864 (Williams 1934). Where the employer elects
to proceed under the act, but the employee does not, the action is still the same as at
common law. Id. § 6863. But where the employee elects to proceed under the act, while
the employer does not, the defenses of the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk and
contributory negligence are abrogated. Id. § 6862.
2. The rule originated in Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex.
1837). One of the first cases setting up the fellow servant rule in this country was Farwell
v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 49 (1842). This decision was based upon
public policy and also upon the theory that the negligence of a fellow servant was one
of the ordinary risks assumed when one enters employment. For the history and rationale
of the rule, see McKtNNEY, FELLOW SERVANTS 1-23 (1890).
3. E.g., Cecil Lumber Co. v. McLeod, 122 Miss. 767, 85 So. 78, 11 A.L.R. 776
(1920) (employer held liable for knowingly hiring a deaf employee whose incompetence
caused injury to plaintiff, a fellow servant). Also see 3 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT

§§ 1079-80 (2d ed. 1913).
4. E.g., Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Shanks, 69 Kan. 306, 76 Pac. 856
(1904) (employer held liable for negligence of employee who failed to give-warning to
men in shale pit, a duty which could not be satisfied by mere delegation).
5. E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Jackson, 106 Tenn. 438, 61 S.W. 771 (1901) (conductor and negligent station master not fellow servants, each being employed in separate
and distinct departments). For an exhaustive discussion of the "departmental doctrine,"
see 4 LABBATT, MASTER AND SERVANT §§ 1425 et seq. (2d ed. 1913).
6. E.g., Chattanooga Electric Ry. v. Lawson, 101 Tenn. 406, 47 S.W. 489 (1898)
(employer held liable for negligence of track foreman in ordering a track hand to board
moving car). For a collection of cases, see 4 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT § 1478 (2d
ed, 1913).
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Although under the vice principal exception to the fellow servant rule,
sometimes called the superior servant rule, a subordinate employee generally
was permitted to recover, 7 it was well settled that a vice principal could not
recover from the employer for the negligence of an employee under his
control.8 Denial of recovery was usually based on the theory that the vice
principal assumed the risks of injury when he assumed control of subordinate
employees, 9 but it was also said that the subordinates were fellow servants
as far as the vice principal was concerned, 10 so that to this extent the fellow
servant rule survived.
In addition to the numerous judicial qualifications of the fellow servant
rule, statutory enactments have further restricted the use of the rule so that
it now applies to relatively few cases. The Federal Employers' Liability Act
abolished the rule as a defense to actions arising under that legislation," and
modified the defenses of assumption of risk 12 and contributory negligence. 13
Workmen's Compensation Acts, now adopted by all of the states, 14 being
based on an entirely different theory than fault of the defendant, have
eliminated these defenses in instances within the scope of the acts. 1 They
7. Massachusetts expressly rejected the superior servant rule, considering all employees to be fellow servants, regardless of grade. Moody v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 159
Mass. 70, 34 N.E. 185 (1893). A majority of the courts recognizing the superior servant
rule have allowed recovery only for those negligent acts of the vice principal which are
done in an official capacity and have not allowed recovery if the negligent act of the vice
principal was done on the same level or in common labor with the injured employee.
E.g., Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N.Y. 516 (1880); Dwyer v. American Express Co., 82 Wis.
307, 52 N.W. 304 (1892). The following Tennessee cases clearly set forth this doctrine
of dual capacity. Gann v. Nashville, C. & St. L.R.R., 101 Tenn. 380, 47 S.W. 493 (1898) ;
Illinois Central R.R. v. Bolton, 99 Tenn. 273, 41 S.W. 442 (1897). Under this majority
view, the character of the act is, in many cases, the equivalent of the performance of a
nondelegable duty for which, if done negligently, the employer would be liable under another exception to the fellow servant rule. See note 4 supra. Thus the vice principal
doctrine would not really be needed in deciding these cases. See Note, 1 IOWA L. BULL.
83 (1915). A minority of courts have held, however, that the liability of the master
depends merely upon the rank of the vice principal without regard to the character of
the act involved. E.g., Russ v. Wabash Western Ry., 112 Mo. 45, 20 S.W. 472 (1892).
See Note, 14 B.U.L. RFv. 845 (1934) (criticizing the doctrine of dual capacity followed
by the majority).
8. McGrory v. Ultima Thule, A. & M. Ry., 90 Ark. 210, 118 S.W. 710, 23 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 301 (1909) ; accord, Linemueller v. Arthur, 127 La. 500, 53 So. 732 (1910);
McCarty v. Rood Hotel Co., 144 Mo. 397, 46 S.W. 172 (1898).
9. McGrory v. Ultima Thule, A. & M. Ry., 90 Ark. 210, 118 S.W. 710, 23 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 301 (1909) ; Linemueller v. Arthur, 127 La. 500, 53 So. 732 (1910).
10. Ibid.
11. 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. § 54 (1943).
See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 232 U.S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327
(1912), upholding constitutionality of the act.
12. Assumption of risk is abolished as a defense in so far as the "negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier" is concerned. 35 STAT. 66
(1908), as amended, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. § 54 (1943).
13. Contributory negligence does not bar recovery, but only mitigates damages. 35
STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C.A. § 53 (1943).
14. Mississippi was the last state to enact such a law, becoming effective January
1, 1949. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 6998-01 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
15. Abolition of the defenses by this type statute has also been upheld. New York
Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917).
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frequently abrogate the defenses when tort actions by servant against
master are permitted.
After the statutory modifications of the employer's common law defenses,
several cases have held that a vice principal may recover from his employer
for the negligence of a subordinate.'0 The court in the instant case, however,
refused to allow recovery by a vice principal, on the theory that the mastervice principal relationship was not contemplated in the abolition of the defenses by the Workmen's Compensation Act.17
It might seem that the present decision undermines the effect of excluding
common law defenses by statute. But, as the court said in the instant case,
"it is not contributory negligence or assumption of risk with which we are
here dealing. It is rather the failure on the part of the plaintiff to exercise
a primary responsibility."' 18 Here the vice principal was primarily negligent
in failing to control the driver. In such cases it is well recognized that an
employee is liable directly to his employer for any injury or loss sustained
by the employer because of the employee's failure to exercise reasonable care
in the performance of his duties,' 9 as when he fails to supervise properly an
employee under his control where proper supervision might have prevented
the loss. 20 Certainly it would avail nothing to allow recovery by the vice
principal for a servant's act when the employer could in turn hold the vice
principal for his failure to prevent the act.
16. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Cobb, 126 Ark. 225, 190 S.W. 107 (1916) (under
the Employers' Liability Act, the effect of which was to exclude defenses of assumption
of risk, contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule) ; Bloxam v. Stave & Timber
Corp., 172 N.C. 37, 89 S.E. 1013 (1916) (under the "Fellow Servant Act," abrogating
assumption of risk and fellow servant rule as defenses).
17. 232 S.W.2d at 795.

18. Ibid.
19. See 2 SHERMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 260 (Rev. ed. 1941) ; Note. 110
A.L.R. 831 (1937).
20. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 405 (1933).

